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THE TELLING POWER OF CCA —
A NEW ZEALAND ORAL HISTORY
Abstract: This report presents results of research on the failure of
the inflation accounting standard in New Zealand. Presentation of
the results in three narratives highlights that any such research is a
series of interlocking and overlapping events, and that narrative is a
direct and efficient means of communicating both causal and transactional components which contributed towards the outcomes. Isolation of the three narratives was chosen to demonstrate that it is
not useful to extol an explanatory or interpretative paradigm for
accounting history if it is advocated at the expense of sequential
accounts of events.

To undertake an oral history project in accounting is to be
immersed in narratives of those to whom the microphone is
directed. As researchers listen and then transcribe, they imbue
resonances and drama, even trauma, from accounting events as
experienced by their group of interviewees, to the point when
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debate on narrative and counternarrative [Funnell, 1998] seems
unrelated to the day-to-day problems of recording, transcription, analysis, and writing up. However, acting on the proposal
by Funnell [1998, p. 144] that "to comprehend the constitutive
effect of the narrative is to open the prospect for liberation
from our sanctioned and settled past," the following report of
this oral history research project was isolated into three narratives. The separation illuminates the constitutive power of narrative in accounting history and, from such illumination, an
advocacy of the utility and role of narrative.
One aspect of narrative analyses in literary studies is the
identification of hegemonic forces which influence, shape, and
order the meanings of events and the m a n n e r of remembrance.
There are exemplary studies in other disciplines, such as the
analysis by Landau of "Human Evolution as Narrative" [1984]
in which was presented an analysis of narrative used in accounts of h u m a n evolution, utilizing established methods of
analysis of folk stories. Just as explanations of h u m a n evolution
inevitably utilize narrative and can be analyzed using literary
methods, so also research histories can be analyzed as struggles
for success, with both malevolent and benevolent powers driving events outside the control of individuals.
In this case of the debate about current cost accounting
(CCA) and the introduction of "inflation accounting standards,"
the hegemonic process is one whereby the interests of other
groups (account preparers and users) are coordinated with
those of the dominant group. However, hegemony, as a social
process, is continually resisted, limited, altered, and challenged
[Brow, 1990, p. 1]. The failure of the CCA standard is one example of such resistance; ultimately, it delineated limitations
on the standard-setters' power. It is inevitable to the normative
nature of standard setting that the process should produce
standards which could fail. A failure in the standard-setting
process can be clearly understood when a narrative structure
identifies the significance of different events in the process of
resistance and change. Added to this are the perceptions of
those involved who, with the benefit of hindsight and contemplation, provide their own accounts of the failure which provides an understanding of events different from analyses of the
causes of failure based on reasons in company reports.
THE FIRST NARRATIVE: THE RESEARCH PROJECT
The first narrative relates the story of the research, why
and
how it was developed and the methods used. This introduchttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/2
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tion ensures that other scholars may gain sufficient information
not only to judge the results of the research but also to apply or
extend these methods if they are deemed beneficial.
The failure of the CCA standard was chosen as an oral
history subject because the 1982 promulgation of the CCA
standard was rejected on a scale unprecedented within New
Zealand's generally "obedient" accounting community.
The failure of current cost accounting standards has been
subject to scrutiny elsewhere. For U.K. events see Tweedie and
Whittington [1984] and Pong and Whittington [1996], while a
summary of continuing developments in Australia in the use of
current value accounting is provided by Jones and Love [1995].
Compliance with the standard in New Zealand was less
than ten percent of listed company reports over the two to three
years of financial reports studied [Peterson et al., 1984]. Unlike
other countries, the resistance was not so m u c h from practitioners as m u c h as companies and their boards, largely attributed at the time to the lack of acceptability for tax purposes
[Peterson et al., 1984]. Eventually, in October 1985, the standard was dropped. It went out with a whimper, not a bang; yet,
these events still continue to impact the development of accounting in New Zealand.
The resonance of this event is such that it is ideally suited
for oral h i s t o r y r e s e a r c h . J u s t as t h e orally t r a n s m i t t e d
whakapapa of the Maori 1 in New Zealand are not so m u c h genealogies as records of events and people whose resonance continued for m u c h time, so this event, the demise of the CCA
standard, has affected and continues to impact the development
of accounting. Oral histories have the capacity to pick up such
resonances, as in this case where the recall of events is filtered
through the current consciousness of the participants ten years
after the events.
Debate concerning the merits and problems with oral history methods are a well-trammelled ground for historians over
the last two decades. Since a 1991 review of the potential for
oral history in accounting [Collins and Bloom, 1991], there
have been other advocates of the merits of this method in accounting research. For example, oral history is advocated because it is a dynamic process which creates evidence about the
past and allows undocumented perspectives to emerge [Tyson,

1

Whakapapa are Maori genealogies relating individuals to various tribes
and/or ancestors.
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1996, p. 2]. Because it provides insights into how people felt
about what happened and focuses on individual experiences,
reactions, and aspirations, this approach enables participants,
rather t h a n historians, to reconstruct past events [Allen and
Montell, 1981, p. 20; H a m m o n d and Sikka, 1996, p. 79; Thompson, 1988, p. 99] and addresses the problem of belief transference by the historian [Merino and Mayper, 1993, p. 244; Tyson,
1996, p. 2]. The multiplicity of experiences of individuals involved in an event such as the CCA debate challenges simple
causal explanations for the failure of the standard. H a m m o n d
and Sikka [1996, p. 81] described the potential of oral history
was to show that "history is a lived experience which is full of
contradictions, contestation and unforseen consequences."
Nevertheless, the merits of the methodology are still debated, especially the subjective nature of the testimonies, because they are complex cultural products [Edwards, 1993, p.
28]. Specifically, the memory of past events may be subject to
biased reinterpretation, selective retention, or innocent amnesia. In addition, the context in which the interview is undertaken is very important to the perspective supplied. "We who
use life stories need to understand . . . they always have to be
structured, according to known conventions, in order to convey
the desire . . . of this teller to present a self to the listener, at
this particular moment" [Tonkin, 1990, p. 34].
It is not the purpose of this report to review fully the merits
and disadvantages of this method. Suffice it to note that the
oral history approach requires a conscious trade-off between
the potential and the problems in such a method, given the time
available and the opportunities presented in the ongoing research process. In this case, the research began in August 1993.
Assistance from the Oral History Section of the National Library of New Zealand included the Fyfe and Manson [1991]
guide, Oral History and How to Approach It, the ethical code
established by the National Oral History Association of New
Zealand, the legal release form, and the interviewee information sheet which has to accompany any tape deposited in the
archives. The use of a legal release form at the start of each
interview was particularly i m p o r t a n t as it r e m i n d e d interviewees that their agreements m e a n t tapes and transcripts
would move into the public domain. All interviewees signed this
form unconditionally although the form does allow for conditions on release if required.
An initial approach was made to those who were considered to be most cognizant of these events. Of the ten men inihttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/2
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tially approached or corresponded with, two did not reply. A
lengthy communication with one potential interviewee, who
considered that the research should focus only on technical
aspects of CCA, resulted in his declining the interview for the
proposed subject matter of this project. After starting the interviews, four more interviewees were approached, resulting in
eleven interviews between August 1993 and February 1994 (see
Appendix A). The length of interviews varied, most being approximately one hour.
It can be observed from Appendix A that the standard setters and academics interviewed formed a homogeneous group
of New Zealand pakeha2 males. This project did not attempt to
seek responses from rank-and-file practitioners or from corporate financial controllers. Although one of the strengths of oral
history is its capacity to allow other voices (especially of minority groups) to be heard [Hammond and Sikka, 1996, p. 79], this
would have resulted in a m u c h extended field of inquiry.
The objective of this project, as described in the letters to
interviewees requesting their participation, was to use oral history techniques in order to contribute to the historical record of
the CCA debate in New Zealand; in particular, asking about
recollections or reminiscences of the events surrounding the
dropping of the CCA standard and how this debate revealed
aspects of the relationship between practitioners and accounting standard-setting authorities between 1975 and 1985. The
emphasis in the research shifted to the first objective as there
was little interest by interviewees in the second objective. Comments in response to the questions concerning the second objective were perfunctory or disinterested.
The questions asked of each interviewee were:
1.

What events before the standard was promulgated indicated that there might be considerable noncompliance?
What key events caused the withdrawal?
Do you think CCA as an accounting standard is likely to be
resurrected during other periods of inflation?

2.
3.

2

This term means a white/Caucasian New Zealander. The uniformity of
the gender, race, and status of the subjects meant those interviewed all provided a sense that they were m e n living their lives "as their own." This emphasis is widely recognized by oral historians; for example, in Bertaux-Wiame's
[1982, p . 193] study, she noted it was from their work that m e n derive their
sense of identity, and present themselves "as the subjects of their own lives —
as the actors . . . in contrast with men's accounts, women will not insist on
what they have done; but rather on what relationships existed between themselves and persons close to them."

Published by eGrove, 1999
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What was the impact on the status of the profession?
What does this event tell us about what users want from
financial statements?

Interviews progressed in a relatively unstructured manner.
Sometimes after termination the interviewees would move on
to personal reminiscences or memories of different individuals
involved and subsequent events in their lives. In other cases, the
interviewees would answer largely on the basis of questions
asked, choosing not to recall or comment on issues they did not
consider within the scope of the questions.
Following the copying and transcription of all tapes, a copy
of the interview was sent to each interviewee with a progress report in August 1994. Master copies were lodged with a
copy of transcripts and a project report in the Oral History
Archives in Wellington, New Zealand upon completion of the
research.
The most effective method of analysis was utilization of a
"cut-and-paste" method, facilitated by holding data in multiple
files on a computer with duplication marked carefully. This cutand-paste into 16 topics reduced the 53,000 plus words in the
transcripts to about 23,000 words. The responses were then
reanalyzed to identify commonalities, differences, or particular
phrases which clearly illustrated responses to the topics.
The analysis of the transcripts was an emergent, evolving
process because as segments were identified within the data,
different connections between segments became apparent. The
researcher had to reread transcripts, given the new information
and new structures which were emerging within the data. Sorting and sifting led to seemingly interesting and meaningful discoveries. This process could continue ad infinitum in the absence of constraints in regards to money, time, or energy.
During the interviews, the interviewees raised related issues
including the international context, price controls, the price
freeze, inflation rates, the achievements and quality of the
Richardson Report, the personality of the prime minister (Sir
R. D. Muldoon), the "Waikato Project," 3 and the New Zealand
Society of Accountants Awards for Annual Reports.
It is apparent that some other questions could have been
used as a starting point. For example, the question "Why was

3
The Waikato Project on Inflation Accounting published purchasing
power and price indices, as well as providing education series for practitioners
and new graduates.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/2
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CCA developed in the first place?" might have given a different
emphasis to their perceptions concerning why the standard was
eventually withdrawn. However, the original objective of the
research was to apply theories addressing the issue of the effect of withdrawal of a standard on the legitimation of the
profession through its standard-setting process. The emphasis
was not on the technical aspects of current value accounting.
During analysis it became apparent that the differences between the New Zealand and U.K. events were of significance.
The thesis topic changed from an initial single objective to two
foci — (1) an examination of the similarities and differences
between the attributed causes of the failure of the CCA standard from research at the time, compared with the attributed
causes from the oral history record; and (2) a comparison of the
differences between U.K. and New Zealand events. The resulting thesis was completed by the end of 1994.

THE SECOND NARRATIVE: THE CONSTRUCTION AND
WITHDRAWAL OF THE CCA STANDARD
A shared characteristic of the second and third narratives is
the objective to "gather the data and present them in such a
m a n n e r that 'the informants speak for themselves'" [Strauss
and Corbin, 1990, p. 21]. The resulting presentation of chunks
of transcript inserted into text allows to every degree possible
the spontaneous and meaningful ways in which the interviewees' memories were expressed.
The second narrative commenced a considerable time before the research started in 1993. In 1967, the Consumer Price
Index in New Zealand started to record annual changes over
4%, the s t a r t of a long period of steadily increasing inflation. It
did not fall below this level again until 1991. The start of the
CCA project was linked in interviewees' minds to this inflation
of price indices. The rapid increase was considered to be the
driver behind efforts which led to the promulgation of the
standard, and a subsequent perceived decrease was considered
(by some people) the cause of its failure. Eventually, the Consumer Price Index in New Zealand increased from 6-7% per
a n n u m in 1970 to 17% in 1980.
A n u m b e r of countries p u b l i s h e d C u r r e n t P u r c h a s i n g
Power (CPP) proposals throughout the 1970s. In Australia, the
Current Value Accounting exposure draft was based on revaluation to replacement cost. When inflation rose sharply in the
U.S. in the 1970s, the Securities and Exchange Commission and
Published by eGrove, 1999
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the Financial Accounting Standards Board in SFAS 33 required
supplementary statements, comprising a "real terms" mixture
of replacement cost and purchasing-power data. In January
1974, the U.K. Sandilands Committee was appointed, reporting
back on inflation accounting in June 1975. In the U.K., the
deliberations of the Morpeth Committee resulted in the development by the Accounting Standards Committee of ED 18,
eventually promulgated as SSAP 7.
ED 10, Accounting for the Changes in the Purchasing Power
of Money, was the first exposure draft published by the New
Zealand Society of Accountants (NZSA) in March 1975. The
draft was largely based on the U.K. SSAP 7 and similarly recommended the CPP approach. Inflation was over 10% per ann u m in New Zealand between 1975 and 1988, with the exception of the years in which the government initiated a price
freeze (mid-1982-1984). In March 1976, an analysis of the responses to ED 10 was published in the New Zealand Accountants Journal. It was clear that the vast majority of res p o n d e n t s were o p p o s e d to CPP, w i t h s o m e r e s p o n d e n t s
preferring to wait and see what was going to happen overseas.
Others urged that more research should be undertaken in New
Zealand or suggested there would be confusion over presenting
two sets of financial statements to shareholders, as required by
ED 10. Overall, the CPP method was seen as being seriously
deficient although many agreed that it was a step in the right
direction.
The National Party in New Zealand won the 1975 elections
under the leadership of Rob Muldoon, who was duly declared
prime minister. Muldoon was particularly remembered for being of strong character, and the significance of his opposition
to attempts to establish the CCA standard for taxable income
measurement after the standard as promulgated was frequently
mentioned by interviewees because he was an accountant and
had given support to efforts in the 1970s to develop a form of
inflation accounting.
ED 14, Accounting in Terms of Current Costs and Values,
published in March 1976, recommended that assets should be
shown in the balance sheet at their "value to the business," and
profit should be the result of matching costs with revenues,
both expressed in current terms.
The Americans . . . experimented by having some of the
big companies disclose the current values of their assets and, in other words, I think they probably had a
very
sensible approach in that they tried to do it increhttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/2
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mentally. Whereas we tried to do it, not only us, but
the U.K. and to some extent Australia, tried to go in
boots and all; whereas they just said 'No, let's experiment with the valuation, you disclose the current values of your assets,' and I think it just became more
apparent that that was a stumbling block. It is a very
basic one [Frank Devonport]. 4
In September 1976, the Richardson Committee, a committee appointed by the National Government, released the Report
of the Committee of Inquiry into Inflation Accounting. Considering CPP, CCA, and Continuously Contemporaneous Accounting
(CoCoA), the report recommended that some form of CCA be
required. The inflation rate was then close to 17%. In December
that year, the prime minister pledged support for the Waikato
Inflation Accounting Research Project. The project was ext e n d e d to t r a i n potential and new employees (accounting
graduates) of 120 companies in different "inflation accounting"
methods.
Throughout 1977 and 1978, the NZSA increased its involvement in "inflation accounting" education through publications
in the Accountants Journal and by offering seminars on CCA in
May 1977. However, it was not until December 1978 that GU 1,
Supplementary Financial Statements in Terms of Current Costs
and Values, was published by the NZSA. GU 1 followed the
Richardson Report recommendations very closely.
Parallel to these events was the publication of "inflation
accounting" standards elsewhere — SFAS 33, Financial Reporting and Changing Prices, was promulgated in the U.S. in 1979,
and in 1980 SSAP 16, Current Cost Accounting, was promulgated in the U.K. In New Zealand there were signs of resistance
to change and concern with the immediate effects of CCA on
company profits and taxation revenue.
At the end of 1980, there was a plea by the chairman of the
Accounting and Research Standards Board, Malcolm McCaw,
to members of the NZSA to maintain the commitment to developing a CCA standard. He said, "despite uncertainty in the
problems of transition it was essential for the Society to take a
firm step in the interests of the public, investors and those who
protected investors" [McCaw, 1980, p. 40]. Members were also
reminded that many accountants now considered that historic

4

Readers are referred to Appendix A for a description of the careers of the
interviewees.
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cost accounts were not sufficient to satisfy legal requirements
for a "true and fair view."
In response to GU 1, ED 25, Current Cost Accounting, was
prepared. Although it was very similar to the recommendation
of the Richardson Report and to the U.K. SSAP 16, a major
difference compared with SSAP 16 occurred in the calculation
of the gearing adjustment which took into account revaluation
surpluses on fixed assets.
Seven months later in March 1982, CCA 1, Information Reflecting the Effects of Changing Prices, was published by the
NZSA. It was almost identical to ED 25 and followed the U.K.
SSAP 16 in almost all respects excepting the composition of
monetary working capital and the current cost reserve items to
which the gearing adjustment was to be applied.
The awareness of the levels of noncompliance led to the
offering of a one-day series of workshops and the distribution
of a 20-minute video distributed through the NZSA. However,
in the first major analysis of 147 companies with a financial
year ending around March 1983 [Peterson et al., 1984], there
was only an 8.2% compliance rate. A further study [Cameron
and Heazlewood, 1985] noted an 8.6% compliance rate with
CCA 1 in the reports of 185 companies for reporting periods
ending between the end of March 1983 and February 1984. The
price freeze through price controls was continued for only a
few months after the Labour Party won the election in July
1983. Inflation rates during the freeze had been 6-7%. Inflation
rose again to 13-15% for three years before the sharemarket
"crash" in October 1987.
Two years later in October 1985, the NZSA decided that the
"standard" status of CCA 1 should be dropped, and that it
should be reduced in status to "recommended best practice." In
the U.K., SSAP 16 was also made nonmandatory. ED 38, Accounting for the Effects of Changing Prices, was developed to
replace ED 35 in the U.K., but eventually was not formally
issued. SFAS 33 was being reassessed in the U.S.
It's very difficult for a country, both for the profession
internationally and for the Government, to go down
one path where everyone else is standing still, or going
off somewhere else. . . . It's not a field in which New
Zealand can go it alone [Sir Ivor Richardson].
This narrative of the events indicates standard setting was
seen as a process whereby those controlling the standard setting wished to achieve a public good by improving financial
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/2
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reporting, but lost their "battle" because of factors beyond their
control, such as international events.
I think we did a better job than any of the other countries. The English, Scots had got sorely embarrassed by
their weak-kneed approach to the whole thing, they
lost the vote and so on and they couldn't even control
their own members. . . . The Australians never covered
themselves with glory at any stage. They probably were
rather pragmatic I suppose, they were aware that there
was no great enthusiasm out there in the profession,
certainly not amongst the companies, the companies
are the last people that wanted to be saddled with current cost accounting. . . . The Australians really fooled
around with it and didn't do a great deal [Rex Anderson].
New Zealand provided a scenario which was alternatively
described as being "an experimental niche" or "we couldn't do it
alone," typical of a cultural ambivalence c o m m o n to many aspects of New Zealand cultural or intellectual developments. It
became apparent in the process of the research that the drivers
to the rise and withdrawal of the New Zealand standard were
far more influenced by international events than indicated by
company reports in that period.
These drivers were different from those identified for the
U.K., w h e r e the rise in domestic inflation triggered w h a t
Mumford [1979, p. 98] described as a five-year cycle of events,
ending with a reduction in domestic inflation and interest in
reform dwindling. In the U.S., SFAS 33 had required supplementary disclosures to reflect CCA, but did not require a revised balance sheet. There were disagreements in the U.S. concerning t h e t r e a t m e n t of m o n e t a r y i t e m s a n d c o n t i n u i n g
opposition from practitioners. Inflation had fallen to 3.2% in
1983 [Kirkman, 1985, p. 37], and the promised review after five
years did not eventuate.
THE THIRD NARRATIVE: CAUSES OF THE FAILURE
OF THE CCA STANDARD
The third narrative is focused on the construction of a description of similarities and differences between the attributed
causes of the failure of the CCA standard in research in published articles at the time, compared with the attributed causes
from the oral history record. This comparison of the two
sources demonstrates that utilization of oral history methods
Published by eGrove, 1999
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provides a valuable and unique perspective which contrasts
with that provided from analyses of written data and company
reports.
The Account of Causes of Failure in Published Articles: There
were two initial studies of annual reports to identify the attributed causes of noncompliance. Peterson et al. [1984] evaluated
the response to CCA 1 after the publication of 147 major corporate annual reports for the next reporting period ending on or
after March 31, 1983. This study followed the adoption of the
standard by the NZSA in 1982. Of these 147 companies, only
8.2% published supplementary current-cost accounts. Cameron
and Heazlewood [1985] also analyzed reports for all accounting
periods commencing on or after April 1, 1982 (totaling 185
listed companies) and found an overall compliance rate of
8.6%. The major reasons given for the lack of adoption of CCA
in these research investigations were:
1.

2.

3.

4.

The benefit of CCA was questioned. This reason was variously stated: "served little practical or useful purpose," "not
warranted, confusing, misleading, not cost/beneficial, was
inappropriate," "gave no meaningful information." This
reason was cited by 49% of companies in the Cameron and
Heazlewood [1985] study and 27% in Peterson et al. [1984].
There was subjectivity and complexity in CCA according to
3 1 % of the companies studied by Cameron and Heazlewood and 24% in Peterson et al. CCA was seen as lacking
understandability and not enhancing comparability. The
use of price indices and multiple alternative approaches
was seen as confusing.
CCA was not mandatory, was not recognized for tax or
pricing purposes, and was not a Stock Exchange requirement. 2 1 % of reports in both the Cameron and Heazlewood
and the Peterson et al. studies suggested it was being ignored because it did not have legal, fiscal, or economic
validity.
There was a failure by other public companies to follow the
standard, a reason indicated in the Freightways Report
[Peterson et al., 1984, p. 90].

In only one case in the Peterson et al. [1984] survey did a
company mention that the system was not relevant because of
the "declining" inflation rate, while 3 of the 72 companies
in the Cameron and Heazlewood study [1985] noted this reason
for noncompliance. The artificial decline in the inflation rate
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/2
12
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was caused by the wage and price freeze. Further details of the
Cameron and Heazlewood results are provided in Appendix B.
Peterson et al. [1984, p. 91] found it "difficult to accept that
the reasons mentioned are valid ones for failure to comply with
the standard." In their view, the primary reason was that CCA
results in a reduction in reported profits, thus negatively affecting share prices and terms of loan finance. This view was substantiated by comments from the oral history interviews which
indicated that management did not want to be seen in a bad
light. For example, Bob Pope observed, "There were others who
did not like it because it did in fact portray a m u c h poorer
result in most cases."
The results of these two studies were supplemented by
Wong's 1988 research into 15 New Zealand companies which
utilized CCA to provide supplementary information to the financial accounts during the period from 1977-1981 (i.e., while
CCA was voluntary). These entities showed higher effective tax
rates, lower leverage, larger market capitalization, and more
capital intensity. All these results are consistent with positivist
theories which focus on incentives to change accounting policies.
Reviewing the causes of noncompliance, Cowan [1985, p.
52] divided the opinions of the accounting profession into two
groups, those who thought CCA was now a lost cause and those
who attributed its failure to lack of support from others inside
and outside the profession. He attributed the noncompliance to
the following factors:
1.

2.

3.

The proposals were not successful because New Zealand
had not considered an independent "locally developed" solution but had tried to improvise from methods of accounting for inflation advocated in other jurisdictions [Cowan,
1985, p. 53].
There were frustrated hopes as some preparers anticipated
that they would initially provide supplementary information using CCA rather t h a n replacing historic-cost-based
financial reports. Subsequently, when CCA was proven to
be a fully workable standard, it would then replace the
modified historic-cost basis. The lack of compliance frustrated this objective [Cowan, 1985, p. 53].
The NZSA had failed to appreciate its role in mediating
between theoretical or academic purists, and there were
constraints experienced by practitioners in applying a

Published by eGrove, 1999
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standard which may have been theoretically pure but was
too subjective for practitioners.
There were seen to be defects in the CCA model. It was too
subjective, limited in scope, too complex, and not integrated closely enough with previous techniques of asset
measurement.

Cowan [1985, p. 52] argued that the profession had to continue its advocacy of some system of inflation accounting in
order to mitigate the extreme misinformation flowing out of
accounts based on historic cost, even if it meant adjusting the
"product" to meet the needs of "consumers." "This is no time to
give up on inflation accounting. The problem which it addresses is much too serious." By then, virtually everyone else
had turned their backs on the proposals, and his pleas were
largely ignored.
Reasons for Noncompliance from the Oral History: The perceived
causes of noncompliance from oral history tapes are listed below, with the more frequently described factors listed first:
1.

CCA was not going to be permitted to be used for the calculation of taxable income after companies had seen it as a
mechanism to reduce taxable income. This cause was cited
by Frank Devonport, John Hagen, Roger Hopkins, Bob
Pope, Malcolm McCaw, Don Trow, and John Hagen. A related view was that the Government had not given a strong
enough signal of support, such as endorsement by the Securities Commission (noted by Rex Anderson, Malcolm
McCaw, and Bob Pope):
Well, no government was prepared to say they had
a tax rate of 900 in the dollar. If they accepted that
current cost accounting was the proper basis for
reporting financial accounts and for taxation levy,
they couldn't drop their tax bills, so they would
have had to, or adjust the tax base in some other
way, they were just not prepared to do it. It was
politically unacceptable. That was the crux of the
matter [Bob Pope].
If Muldoon had said you could have had it for tax,
then probably it would have rolled in. . . . People
would think they had got a big reduction in tax
[Frank Devonport].

Although it was recognized:
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/2
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We felt obliged to make some modifications to CCA
for financial reporting purposes for pragmatic tax
reasons. For example, if we had applied CCA across
the board for tax purposes there would have been
an element of taxation of capital gains. We felt that
really in the climate of the times that that would
not be acceptable across the board to the public;
and so we adopted a compromise of recognising for
tax purposes the benefits of the use of borrowed
funds, but only up to the point of the CCA deductions in other respects [Sir Ivor Richardson].
2.

CCA was either too complicated or complex, or it was too
radical and too fundamental a change, mentioned by John
Hagen, Frank Devonport, Roger Hopkins, and Rex Anderson:
It was more a growing belief by the business community or the financial community generally saying
'This was too complicated. We don't understand it.'
There was a sort of gathering storm of protest saying: 'Too complicated' [John Hagen].
This standard was the first one which drove to the
heart of the m e a s u r e m e n t process, and I think
again fundamentally that was something that the
Society couldn't handle, it was new to them. Here
we were putting up a Standard, which said you are
going to have to measure things a different way. It
is not a question of disclosure and reporting, not a
question of how you analyse and classify and report
to people, you are going to have to measure it differently and this cut right to the core of the accepted thinking [Roger Hopkins].

3.

CCA was not adopted because it showed a lower profit (as
noted by Malcolm McCaw) and reported less favorable results (according to John Hagen, Athol Mann, and Don
Trow):

The proposal not to use it for tax purposes was the
thrust of the dagger into the body of CCA that took
the life out of it. People had not realised, I don't
think, that that was the m o m e n t that CCA died, especially accountants who were keen to box on; and
I think, naively, accountants got a bit of surprise
when they found company directors did just not
want to produce CCA accounts, because it was contrary to what they had said they were going to do,
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and one hadn't appreciated that these directors, as
they always are, always had been particularly in
those days, always wanting to show themselves as
good performers, never wanting to attract criticism,
always taking steps to minimise criticism....There is
no way that company directors in general were going to produce CCA information, particularly if say
only a third of the companies were going to do it,
because their result was invariably going to be a
worse result; it would have been the very odd company that might have had a better result, and they
didn't just want to put themselves into the category
of those who very clearly had a inferior result [Don
Trow].
4.

One reason given was that inflation elsewhere was falling
(John Hagen), falling in New Zealand (Malcolm McCaw),
or ceased to have the impact it had had on "true and fair"
(Bob Pope):
Then inflation round the world started to reduce,
and pressure for current cost data reduced. Unfortunately the battle was lost [John Hagen].
Inflation disappeared or ceased to have the impact
that it was previously having on true and fair reporting [Bob Pope].

5.

Another reason was that the indices were too subjective
(noted by Frank Devonport and Malcolm McCaw):
We have still got exactly the same problem that was
being faced then. This was the problem of measurem e n t . You see, even t o d a y we are a d v o c a t i n g
valuers to value or revalue assets and the valuers
are scrambling to try and produce a set of standards for valuation. You can go to two different
valuers to get the valuation you want. They differ so
much, and I think this is basically the same problem as you had with CCA [Frank Devonport].

6.

John Hagen and Athol Mann considered that noncompliance will follow if the market does not like the standard:

If I adopted CCA and you didn't, the n u m b e r s we
reported were distorted in the minds of the public
and to some extent by company directors; they said
'There are not sufficient companies using it, so
therefore we are going to stop using it, because it
shows us in a bad light even though we really do
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/2
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understand it and agree it was the right thing to do'
[John Hagen].
7.

Roger Hopkins and Rex Anderson thought it had been too
cumbersome and costly:
It was going to take resources and would cost
money to produce something that nobody really
saw any great use of [Rex Anderson].

8.

John Hagen described one of the causes as a case of the
theory being "miles ahead" of the practice:
It was a good example of a standard . . . the implementation of an accounting standard where the
theory was miles ahead of the practice and the academic part of the profession was miles ahead of the
companies, and there was no intention to take account of politics in accounting standards. . . . I
think it is because the standard setters at that time
did not comprehend sufficiently, in any way, that
you cannot j a m standards down peoples throats
and hope they will accept them. And if they don't
like them, then the business community will scuttle
them.

9.

Roger Hopkins noted that we had learned to live with
(modified) historic cost and allow for it:
They know how, for instance, allowances for depreciation on historical cost are not going to allow for
the cost of replacement, but they know that and
understand it and they make, just as the corporate
director used to do, the necessary adjustments, if
they want to transfer from that model into the real
world of decision making.

10. A further factor was conservative boards of directors:
I was sure in those days that a lot of Boards of
Directors just didn't want to even think about it.
They just didn't want to go through the hassle of
understanding what it was all about . . . (there was)
a desire to keep on the old ways, and, as I say, there
were a lot of members of our profession who gave
them some support too. . . . I think probably those
of us who were keen on it were so enthused with it
that we assumed that we had the right answer, and
everybody was going to abide by this [Bruce Christmas].
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11. Malcolm McCaw recalled that New Zealand was seen as an
"experimental niche:"
A lot of people overseas thought we were an interesting little experimental niche out there, and they
were interested to see what happened. In the meantime they weren't going to do anything; and banks
and those sort who would have been the ones to
benefit from this sort of policy, because they had
their own ways of working out, working out the
accounts and making adjustments to those forecasts to decide on companies and their future prospects et cetera.
12. Tony van Zijl considered that it was realized that the usefulness of the incremental information was close to zero:
Well, I think one of the things that happened was
that people started doing empirical research on the
incremental information content of that kind of information, and the consensus that emerged from
that was that it probably was close to zero. Now
t h a t doesn't m e a n to say t h a t the i n f o r m a t i o n
wasn't of any value, but rather that there were probably alternative sources for that information, so
that in terms, anyway, of usefulness to investors,
the information rated very low.
13. According to Athol Mann, companies would not utilize CCA
if their competitors were not:
In the interests of their own company, people simply weren't prepared to make a conversion unless
their competitors did, they couldn't afford, they felt,
to leave themselves out on a limb in relation to
accounts published under a CCA approach if their
competitors in the same industry didn't do the
same.
14. Rex Anderson recalled that at that time academics were
more inclined to continue debating rather than resolve the
issues:
The last thing they want to happen in an academic
argument, is for resolution to be reached. It's a
plaything, they like to go on; and the fact that
somebody knowledgeable by propounding his views
can slow the whole process down, in fact ruin it,
doesn't worry them, provided that they get their
own way.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/2
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DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE
EXPLANATIONS FOR NONCOMPLIANCE
The data presented in the oral history narrative show a
variety of viewpoints, some of which provide an understanding
different from the existing consensus in the literature on the
causes of the failure of the inflation accounting standard in
New Zealand. Readers will develop their own comparisons
from the information provided and existing knowledge of explanations for the failure of such standards. This account will
therefore enable readers to develop further their own understanding of these events, given their individual preferences for
any weighting they may wish to place on the different sources.
The two sources are of a very different nature, resulting in
very different emphases. Most of the emphases from insights
provided by the oral histories were on political or contracting
costs, whereas the emphases from annual reports analyses were
on comparability, costliness, and usefulness. Although there
may be distortions from the effect of memory in oral history,
other sources of data have different problems of selectivity and
partiality. However imperfect sources may be, the comparison
is illuminating.
The comparison between the analysis of the reasons for
noncompliance from papers written in 1983-1985 and the oral
histories shows the major similarity in these two sources is the
"tax issue." Standard setters looked back with hindsight and
determined that the lack of CCA 1 acceptance for taxation purposes was its "death sentence." Comments were often phrased
in the death metaphor.
The major difference was a compelling insistence, especially in the comments of Frank Devonport, Roger Hopkins,
Rex Anderson, and John Hagen, that CCA was a fundamental
change in the approach to the measurement of income. If one is
expecting people's behavior to change (which it should do in
the light of a changed standard), then there are major political
considerations inherent in the standard-setting process which
have to be taken into account. This point was most emphasized
by John Hagen. The analysis closer to the events, as cited, suggested that CCA was "just a n o t h e r standard" being implemented, although some standard setters, on reflection, clearly
saw it as being essentially different to other new accounting
standards because of the extent to which it represented a fundamental change in accounting principles. The CCA standard was
part of the normative system of standard setting, as Kirk [1988,
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p. 17] noted, "a normative system, however, has definite limits
in its ability to point a policy-making body toward incontrovertible solutions to recognition and measurement problems. Good
intentions and hard work cannot overcome those limits."
Other reasons derived from the published analyses of the
reasons for noncompliance from papers written in 1983-1985
also appear in the standard-setters' perceptions. In addition, the
oral history reflected memories of an increasing lack of commitment by practitioners, and that CCA would reflect negatively
the performance of directors and managers. There were no significant differences in the views of those interviewees who had
been in public practice comp>ared with those w h o h a d led
largely academic careers.
It was also noted by interviewees that directors of larger
multinational companies in New Zealand were prepared to
"give it a go" in the early stages of the development of CCA,
which may be indicative that the thrust to international h a r m o nization was contributing to early support for the standard
from the corporate sector. Eventually the lack of compliance
overseas, coupled with the anticipated fall in inflation driven by
a drop in inflation in New Zealand's major trading partners,
was driving noncompliance in 1982-1983.
This contrasting analysis has highlighted that the reasons
provided by companies for not utilizing the CCA standard are
not all reflected in the reasons as understood by the standard
setters. It could be expected that companies would not attribute
noncompliance to the desire not to show management performance in a "bad light," or that it was too radical or too fundamental a change. It is of note that very few company reports
referred to the anticipated fall in inflation or the political (price
freeze) environment.
This comparison has demonstrated the usefulness of oral
history methods to identify contrasting dynamics behind standard setting where hegemonic forces may elude quantitative
analysis. Oral histories may not result in major revisions, yet
still "add value" to the extant records of an accounting phenomenon.
SEPARATION AND RECONSTITUTION
It is in our nature to reconstitute separate pieces of information into a coherent body of knowledge. The separation of
this accounting history research into three narratives was not
undertaken in order to prevent the coherency of such reconstihttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/2
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tution, but to demonstrate the inevitability of the imposition of
narrative in interpretative or explanatory paradigms.
Thus, the first narrative related the progress and completion of a successful research project. A feature of this research
was the change in the eventual focus for the thesis. This revised
focus was the outcome of the usually undocumented process of
ensuring appropriate scope and coherency to the ultimate research report. It can be assumed that the questions asked of
interviewees would have been different if the eventual focus of
the research had been differently identified to interviewees at
the start. However, if scholars had to remain on an unalterable
trajectory, the potential for discovery from data could be compromised or endangered. The potential of methods such as oral
history is to allow the data to reveal hypotheses previously unanticipated by the researcher, typical of grounded theory where
the theory is inductively derived from the study of the phenomenon it represents [Strauss and Corbin, 1990].
Some refusal to participate as described was not unusual in
such projects and reflects issues of control over the topic. It is
difficult to determine to what extent there was bias in the selection of participants, but the resultant data indicated a breadth
of views was obtained.
The second narrative related the rise and fall of the standard in a series of attempts by the standard setters which were
ultimately unsuccessful. The interviews revealed an importance
of the international context previously unrecognized in New
Zealand studies of the failure of the CCA standard [Peterson et
al., 1984; Cameron and Heazlewood, 1985; Cowan, 1985; Wong,
1988]. Economic pressures, in particular the inflation rate,
were observed to have less impact on the failure of the CCA
standard in New Zealand compared with other jurisdictions.
The third narrative combined archival data (written explanations for the failure) with the oral history data in order to
make a comparison. As such, it transversed the two paradigms
of accounting history as described by Tyson [1996, p. 2]. To
study causes of lack of compliance is typical of accounting history studies with an objective of ensuring the utility of accounting history. The third narrative reflected that standard setters
consider there are "lessons to be learned" from the failure of
the standard. Historical studies should provide a record of past
experiences which help in current standard-setting issues; yet,
standard setters continue to attempt to disconnect the CCA episode from current standard setting. For example, recently in the
U.K. the ASB announced in the progress paper on the exposure
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draft of the Statement of Principles for Financial Reporting
that, "The Board emphatically states that it has never had any
plans to impose a system of current cost accounting. . . " [Accounting Standards Board, 1996, p. 1] in response to many
expressions of concern that the ASB was trying to reestablish
CCA. Such strong denial of any likely role for CCA in future
standard setting indicates negative resonance from past events
is ongoing.
CONCLUSION
The isolation of the three components of this research into
separate narratives implies each has now been completed, but
in reality all three are ongoing. The data could sustain new
research outputs as the debate about current value accounting
is ongoing in New Zealand and elsewhere. The composition and
understanding of these events might also undergo reexamination and recomposition in the minds of those involved in the
events 20 years ago.
Narratives were chosen because they provide a flexible tool
with which to communicate events; narrative is not characteristic of particular fields of research. It may be less explicit in the
traditional scientific method of research description, but the
most rigorous scientific procedures for establishing a method
of scientific testing are sequential in structure and in the reporting thereof. It would have been possible to build up at least
six or eight narratives, like the layers of an onion, in order to
report fully this study of the failure of the CCA standard in New
Zealand. The richness from this record is to be found not in any
inner kernel of truth, but in the process of reaching the innermost layer as each narrative is read and contextualized, allowing its constitutive effect to be appreciated.
Results presented in this m a n n e r highlight that any such
research is a series of interlocking and overlapping events. Narrative is not only a direct and efficient means of communicating both causal and transactional elements in events, but also
clearly delineates delusions and failures. It is a limitation of
narrative that the conceptual complexity of events is simplified
into a singular process, but such limitations assist communication and comprehension.
The tool of narrative has sometimes been transformed into
a metaphor for "whiggish" tendencies of history — tendencies
to highlight successful endeavors which contributed to the ascendancy of the present while casting past failures into unrehttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/2
22

Baskerville: Telling power of CCA -- A New Zealand oral history
Baskerville: Telling Power of CCA

23

corded shadows. Undoubtedly narrative has been constructed
to this end, but such uses should not exclude recognition of its
value, or indeed its inevitability, in explanatory or interpretative
paradigms.
This study has provided an example validating Carnegie
and Napier's [1996, p. 8] view that the strengths of accounting
history are from its firm basis in the "archive," which includes
the oral records here presented. Furthermore, it demonstrates
that "accounting history is enhanced by locating our narratives
within an understanding of the specific context in which the
object of our research emerges and operates." Such enrichment,
through an increasing contribution of oral history studies in
different jurisdictions, will ensure a fertile database for future
accounting history studies.
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APPENDIX A
Interviewees
Appointments relevant
to the research
Rex Anderson

More recent
activities

NZSA, president, 1984-1985; practitioner; m e m b e r of the
ARSB, chairman, 1983,
Securities Commission,
Financial Subcommittee,
1985-1994
member, 1973-1988,
(chairman, 1983)

Bruce Christmas NZSA, president, 1980-1981; practitioner
Council member,
Professional Standards
Committee, chairman
Frank Devonport ARSB, 1968-1979, Financial professor at Canterbury;
Subcommittee, 1979-1992
continuing m e m b e r of
FRSB committees
John Hagen

ARSB, 1982-1989, Financial
Subcommittee, chair,
1977-1982

chairman of the Governmentappointed ASRB, 1994;
practitioner in Deloittes

Roger Hopkins

ARSB, 1982-1983

professor, Waikato, 19811984; Victoria University,
1990-present

Malcolm McCaw NZSA, president, Council,
1976-1985; ARSB,
chairman; expert advisor to
the Richardson Committee

consultant for Deloittes

Athol Mann

NZSA, president, 1976-1977; dean of Faculty of ComCouncil, 1968-1978;
merce, Victoria University,
1987-1996
Securities Commission,
1979-1986

Bob Pope

ARSB, 1972-1979, chairman, consultant to KPMG Peat
1975-1979; NZSA, Council,
Marwick
1975-1981, president,
1980-1981

Ivor Richardson Royal Commission on
Inflation Accounting,
chairman, 1976; formerly
partner in a Wellington
law firm

chief judge, Court of Appeal,
New Zealand

Don Trow

ARSB, 1968-1989; NZSA,
Council, 1976-1989

professor, Victoria University,
1972 - present

Tony van Zijl

NZSA, technical director,
1985

current m e m b e r of FRSB a n d
ARSB; professor, Victoria
University, 1989- present
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APPENDIX B
Reasons for Noncompliance from
Analyses of Company Reports
The following s u m m a r y is from the study by Cameron and Heazlewood [1985].
Their study of 185 company reports with reporting dates between 3/31/83 2/29/84 overlapped reports studied by Peterson et al. [1984]. In the Cameron
and Heazlewood study:
No. of reports

%

CCA mentioned but no reason given for
noninclusion

4

2.2

CCA mentioned and reasons given for
noninclusion

72

38.9

CCA not mentioned

93

50.3

Companies presenting CCA statements

16

8.6

185

100

Total

Of the 72 reports which disclosed reasons for noncompliance, 108 reasons
were given:
CCA serves little or no purpose.

16

CCA is not recognized for tax purposes.

13

CCA is confusing or misleading to members.

12

Application of CCA to the company's results would not be
appropriate.

11

CCA methods are too subjective.

8

There is as yet no agreed uniform method of accounting for
changes in price levels.

7

CCA statements were prepared but not presented.

7

CCA will not be implemented until it is more widely understood
and accepted.

7

Time spent on CCA is not cost-beneficial.

7

CCA is not warranted.

5

Primary accounts already reflect CCA principles in some form
or another.

4

CCA is no longer valid now that the rate of inflation has dropped.

3

CCA is not recognized for pricing purposes.

3

CCA results do not allow comparability.

2

CCA is not a legal requirement.

2

CCA does not give a true and fair view.

1
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